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MARRIAGE AND BELONGING
Ann Laquer Estin*

A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION. By
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2000. Pp. v, 297.

PUBLIC Vows:

Nancy F. Cott.

$27.95.

Marriage is a quintessentially private institution. Justice Douglas
put the point this way in 1965, writing for the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut:1
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loy
alty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as no
ble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.2

Ironically, this appeal to history elided the fact that the Court's deci
sion made a substantial break with a longstanding tradition of mar
riage regulation. In hindsight, Griswold's paean to privacy stands as an
important turning point. American family law changed quickly and
radically in the years that followed. What has remained constant is the
belief that family life is private, even as the meaning of family privacy
has changed.
The subject of Nancy Cott's Public Vows: A History of Marriage
and the Nation3 seems startling at first in view of this conventional un
derstanding. As she suggests, "[t]he monumental public character of
marriage is generally its least noticed aspect" (p. 1). Cott addresses
this oversight with a sweeping investigation into marriage and family
policy throughout American history. She argues that "[f]rom the
founding of the United States to the present day, assumptions about
the importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been deeply
implanted in public policy, sprouting repeatedly as the nation took
over the continent and established terms for the inclusion and exclu
sion of new citizens" (p. 2).
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. A.B. 1979, Dartmouth; J.D. 1983, University of
Pennsylvania. - Ed. My thanks to Linda Kerber and Pat Cain for their comments.

1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Id. at 486.
3. Nancy Cott is Stanley Woodward Professor of History and American Studies, Yale
University.
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The approved model of marriage in American law and policy,
based on religious tradition and the English common law, was quite
specific: lifelong, monogamous, Christian marriage. Founded on a
principle of mutual consent, marriage echoed and reinforced the pre
vailing political ideals (pp. 2-3). In Public Vows, Cott traces the politi
cal and rhetorical uses of this model of marriage in national debates
about federal Indian policy, immigration law, polygamy in the
Mormon territories, citizenship for former slaves after the Civil War,
and labor and employment policy during the New Deal. She demon
strates that "positive and punitive laws and government policy
choices" established a political definition of marriage with a pervasive
influence on the body politic and the entitlements and obligations of
American citizens (pp. 2-3).
Cott's book also challenges the conventional understanding in the
United States that family regulation is the exclusive province of state
governments. For that reason, this volume adds an important dimen
sion to legal historical work focused on the evolving norms and rules
of family law in the states during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu
ries.4 As she demonstrates, the national government was centrally in
volved in definition and regulation of the family, from a time long be
fore the recent wave of "nationalization" or "federalization" of family
law.
The discussion that follows briefly considers this history in three
stages. For the earliest period, Cott charts the strong link between
domestic and political governance in the philosophy of the founding
generation. Her account demonstrates that, during the nineteenth cen
tury, marriage became central to the definition of citizenship, and
marriage norms were deeply embedded in debates over the civil and
political rights of former slaves, Native Americans, Asian immigrants,
and women. By the twentieth century, with the character of the na
tional polity well established, marriage was effectively disestablished,
as laws enforcing gender roles and creating barriers to divorce and
nonmarital childbearing were abandoned. Cott's analysis describes
how marriage was rewritten in economic terms, and how new norms of
family privacy and liberty accompanied these political and economic
changes.
Beyond its historical significance, Cott's thesis about the public
character of marriage serves to illuminate the contemporary politics of
family life. Her detailed and nuanced historical account ends with a
discussion of recent debates over same-sex marriages and welfare re
form. Cott sees the conservative policies implemented in both of these
areas as illustrations of "the national government's continuing invest
ment in traditional marriage" (p. 223). The second portion of
4.

See particularly MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE

FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

(1985).
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this Review takes up this proposition and considers some of the simi
larities and differences between the current debates and their histori
cal antecedents.
I.

MARRIAGE AND THE NATION

A.

Sculpting the Body Politic

As Cott elaborates, political theorists in the eighteenth century
understood both the family and the state as forms of governance and
drew explicit parallels between the two. In the American context, the
patriarchal equation of father and king gave way to a new image based
on the marriage bond, in which the legitimacy of governance derived
from the voluntary consent of the governed. Once the consensual rela
tionship was established, the parties took on reciprocal rights and ob
ligations, and once formed, it could not be dissolved. Cott writes that
"[t)he suitability of the marital metaphor for political union drew tre
mendous public attention to marriage itself in the Revolutionary era."5
In both Christian tradition and the common law of the period,
marriage was a strongly hierarchical relationship. Under the system of
coverture, a married woman's legal and economic identity merged into
her husband's. Cott notes that a man's citizenship was enlarged by
marriage, which made him both the political and legal representative
of his wife. "He became the one full citizen in the household, his
authority over and responsibility for his dependents contributing to his
citizenship capacity" (p. 12). This connection between marriage and
men's citizenship status is a centrally important theme in the larger
story that Cott tells.
The right kind of marriage and family life were also understood to
be important for fostering necessary social and political virtues in citi
zens of the new republic. Writers of this period saw close links be
tween domestic government and political government. Following
Montesquieu, they disapproved particularly of polygamy. "The harem
stood for tyrannical rule, political corruption, coercion, elevation of
the passions over reason, selfishness, hypocrisy - all the evils that vir
tuous republicans and enlightened thinkers wanted to avoid. Monog
amy, in contrast, stood for a government of consent, moderation, and
political liberty. "6
Despite the importance of marriage to the national self-definition
in the earliest days of the nation, the national government had few op-

5. P. 16. Cott also notes the reappearance of the marital metaphor for national union in
political rhetoric during the Civil War era. Seep. 77.
6. P. 22. Cott points out that most of the peoples and cultures around the globe were not
strictly monogamous during the 18th century, and the "predominance of monogamy was by
no means a foregone conclusion." P. 9.
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portunities to implement its vision of appropriate marriage norms.
Cott describes federal Indian policy as one arena, pointing out that the
government "consistently encouraged or forced Indians to adopt
Christian-model monogamy as the sine qua non of civilization and mo
rality" (p. 26). She notes that federal policy encouraged intermarriage
between white men and Indian women and periodically offered land
and citizenship to "heads of households" - presumably male - who
agreed to give up their tribal affiliations (p. 28).
During this period, direct regulation of marriage was carried out
by state legislatures and courts, which defined who could be married
and how a marriage was solemnized, what the consequences of mar
riage were, and when and how a marriage could be terminated. Cott
explains that informal marriage and divorce (or desertion) were wide
spread, and that the incidence of bigamy was probably substantial. In
the early years, local communities played a significant role in tolerat
ing or sanctioning marital misbehavior. Between 1820 and 1860, state
legislatures began enacting divorce statutes and revising the system of
coverture through marfied women's property acts. Cott notes that
while the legislation was not identical in different states, the direction
was consistent, and that by midcentury a "uniquely American system"
of divorce laws was in effect across the country (p. 51).
B.

Marriage and Citizenship

Against this background, Cott considers the central role that mari
tal norms played in the transformation of the republic during the nine
teenth century. As she demonstrates, "[m]arriage values and practices
animated the rhetoric of both sides" of the debate over slavery (p. 57).
Abolitionists preached against "the master's power to sever relation
ships between slave couples and families; the inability of enslaved
women to prevent unwelcome white masters, overseers and sons from
using their bodies sexually; and slave men's inability to act effectively
as protectors or defenders" (pp. 57-58). For their part, the defenders
of slavery emphasized its more benign parallels to marriage: wives and
slaves both were dependents, subordinated to the authority of the
husband or master and subject to his guidance and protection. As Cott
points out, this parallel found support in the legal tradition categoriz
ing both master-servant and husband-wife relationships under the ru
bric of "domestic relations."7
Following the Civil War, the tension between these views of slav
ery and marriage played out in the passage of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and Cott traces the appearance of marital
7. P. 62. In the North, of course, the parallel between slavery and marriage had a differ
ent resonance, and Cott also describes the uses of this polemic by opponents of traditional
marriage, including early women's rights reformers and "free love" advocates. Pp. 63-72.
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norms as Congress debated (and rejected) formulations that would
have extended full legal and political rights to women (pp. 80, 95-98).
She describes the Reconstruction-era philosophy that free labor and
marriage rights were complementary. Full citizenship was equated
with taking on rights and responsibilities as a husband and father
(pp. 81-82, 92-95). While former slaves embraced the opportunity to
marry as an important civil right, Cott also documents the significant
pressure exerted by the federal Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and
Abandoned Lands on freedmen and women to formalize their mar
riages and conform to a stringent set of new social norms.8
The other great theme Cott tracks in these debates is federalism.
Before the Civil War, both marriage and slavery were conceptualized
as domestic institutions, within the states' power to regulate.9 While
the Civil War Amendments put an end to slavery, they did not address
the states' power to enact marriage legislation - specifically, laws
against racially mixed marriages (pp. 98-101). Cott notes that couples
contested antimiscegenation statutes in many states during the nine
teenth century on the basis "that marriage was a contractual right
which state laws could not constitutionally abridge," but without suc
cess (p. 101). The courts concluded that marriage was not simply a pri
vate contractual right, but a social and status relationship, and that the
states were entitled to regulate it without federal interference.10
Cott describes significant turbulence in the institution of marriage
during the period following the Civil War, with increasing rates of di
vorce and the specter of Mormon polygamy in the Utah territory
(p. 105). The result was substantial public anxiety over the future
prospects of Christian, monogamous marriage.II Despite significant
discussion of national standards to regulate marriage and divorce, the
argument for federalism was never overcome (pp. 103-04, 110-11). For
almost thirty years, however, the federal government conducted an ex
tensive campaign against polygamy joined by a series of Presidents,

8. Pp. 83-92. Federal Indian policy later in the century followed a similar course. As
Cott points out, " 'Civilizing' meant instituting faithful monogamous households, turning
Indian men into farmers motivated by the work ethic, and urging Indian women toward
norms of modesty and domesticity." P. 121. See generally pp. 120-23.
9. Pp. 99-103. The Republican Party characterized slavery and polygamy as the "twin
relics of barbarism" and asserted the federal government's right to prohibit both of these
evils in federal territories. P. 73 (quoting the Republican party platform of 1856).
10. Pp. 101-03. Later, Cott discusses a new wave of efforts to punish interracial marriage
in the early twentieth century, see pp. 163-64, and the Supreme Court's eventual rejection of
antimiscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). P. 198.
11. Divorce "allowed the possibility of more than one sexual partner in a lifetime, rather
like polygamy." P. 107. Gender norms also played a role here. Cott continues: "If married
men's sexual adventures outside of marriage had often been tacitly accepted, married
women's had not - yet divorce was available to both, and more women than men sought
and gained divorces." Id.
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the Congress and the Supreme Court.12 Cott points out that, with its
decision in Reynolds v. United States,13 the Court associated monog
amy with democracy and polygamy with despotism, casting polygamy
in racial terms as the preserve of "Asiatic and of African people."14
Congress also acted to bolster monogamous marriage and suppress
"immoral" sexual behavior by passing the Comstock Act in 1873,
which criminalized the use of the mails to distribute information or
materials that were "obscene" or intended for immoral use, including
birth control (pp. 123-26). Following this lead, many states directly
outlawed abortion and contraception so that extramarital sex would
be risky and marital sex would remain linked to childbearing
(pp. 123-26). In many states, these laws remained in effect for almost a
century, until the Supreme Court's declaration in Griswold that they
represented an unconstitutional intrusion into rights of marital pri
vacy.15 Cott writes that in the late nineteenth century, however, the
Comstock Act and the battle against polygamy helped to set the nor
mative bounds of marriage, based on "[a] refurbished alliance be
tween national authority and Christian. monogamous morality"
(pp. 130-31).
The strength of the link between marriage norms and national self
definition is revealed particularly powerfully in a chapter that consid
ers national immigration policy. Cott writes: "Marriage bore on the
shape of the body politic just as immigration policy did. Together the
two had dynamic potential to create new kinds of citizens for the
United States, because children born on American soil would be U.S.
citizens regardless of their immigrant parents' own capacity for natu
ralization" (p. 132). Given the close link between notions of marriage
and citizenship, it is not surprising that national immigration policy in
corporated the prevailing norm of the male citizen as the representa
tive and head of a household.16
12. Pp. 111-20. The federal government also attacked polygamy among Native
American people as part of the campaign to "civilize" them. Pp. 120-23.
13. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
14. Pp. 113-14 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164). Cott notes the influence here of the
Christian missionary movement and the association in their discourse of whiteness, Europe,
monogamy, and civilization. Pp. 115-18.
15. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. The federal appellate courts reversed
their position on birth control, concluding that it was not "obscene," in the late 1930s. See
pp. 181-82.
16. By the late nineteenth century, women could become citizens by marriage to a
United States citizen, p. 133, and women lost their citizenship by marriage to a foreign citi
zen. Pp. 143-44. These rules were modified in the 1920s and 1930s. P. 165. Some policies
were designed to allow male immigrants to bring their family members into the United
States, on the theory that they would be better and harder-working citizens. See, e.g., pp.
141-43 (citing an exemption to literacy tests for immediate family members of male immi
grants); pp. 145-46 (describing an agreement allowing immigration of wives and children of
Japanese men already present in the United States).
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Cott's research uncovers a fascinating interaction between mar
riage norms and the increasingly restrictive immigration laws of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In her discussion of the
harsh restrictions on Asian immigration during this period, Cott points
out that alien cultural practices such as arranged marriage and polyg
amy were constituted as racial difference.17 Immigration rhetoric
evinced a particular concern with forced labor and with prostitution,
which implied a threat to American values.18 Polygamists were directly
prohibited from immigrating,19 and arranged marriages were equated
with fraud and prostitution (pp. 149-54). "While marriage was rarely
the cardinal issue in contestation over immigration, insistence on a
given model of monogamy was implicit in concerns about the virtue
and character of the people. Nonconforming marriages represented all
that was 'racially' unassimilable in a given group" (p. 155).
C.

Modern Marriage

Along with technological and social changes at the advent of the
twentieth century, Cott describes a new shape and new understandings
of marriage. "In the twentieth century the public framework of mar
riage would be preeminently economic, preserving the husband's role
as primary provider and the wife as his dependent - despite the
growing presence of women in the labor force" (p. 157). She suggests
that the instrumental importance of families as a means of direct po
litical governance became less important as "the polity itself and na
tional solidarity became firmly established."20 Moreover, "as the post
Victorian generation enjoyed what they considered a sexual revolu
tion, they gave up their parents' exaggerated public emphasis on link
ing monogamous morality to political virtue" (p. 157).
17. Cott writes:
Jews and Asians were more easily accused of masking prostitution as marriage because of
American officials' willingness to believe that "racially" different and non-Christian groups
were likely to commit such grotesquery. . . . Both Asians and Jews - the latter via the Old
Testament - were tainted by association with polygamy. .. . Also, both Jews and Asians in
their home cultures used arranged marriages, in which overt economic bargaining and kin
ship networks beyond the marrying pair played acknowledged parts.
P. 149.
18. P. 137. Regarding the fear of prostitution, see generally pp. 136-38 and 146-49.
19. P. 139 ("[P]olygamists and anarchists always appeared in sequence as excludable,
deportable, and ineligible for citizenship, as if disloyalty to monogamy were equivalent to
overthrowing the government.").
20. P. 157. In the modern context,
no state needs to work through household heads to locate or govern family members: the in
terweaving or intrusion of government presence in the lives of individuals through their em
ployment, schooling, immigration, taxation, social welfare, travel, and so on, has advanced so
far that all are already in the state's grasp.
P. 213.
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Women received the right to vote in 1920 and gained greater citi
zenship and nationality rights in the decades that followed.21 Cott em
phasizes, however, that marital roles and the entitlements of male citi
zens as heads of households remained the "template" within which
federal support for families was inscribed (p. 158). This was a pattern
initially established by Civil War pensions and the policies of the
Freedmen's Bureau, and it was broadened and generalized across the
population with the passage of New Deal legislation, particularly the
Social Security Act.22 Cott writes that "New Deal policy innovations
revivified the fading connection between citizenship and marital role
through economic avenues. These choices diluted the formal political
equality of women and deeply imprinted marriage on citizenship enti
tlements, while refiguring what those entitlements were" (p. 174). In
this new system, "men were defined as individuals, workers and
husband-providers, and women were defined as wives and mothers
first" (p. 178).
The government programs that reinvented marriage and marital
unity during the New Deal were followed by others in the period after
the Second World War, including particularly the GI Bill and the new
combined income tax return for married couples (pp. 190-93). During
and after the war years, traditional gender roles and family ideals were
strongly promoted by the government as central to freedom and the
American way of life (pp. 185-91). Nonetheless, Cott identifies the
decade of the war as an important turning point. "Even while public
policy fortified the 'normal' family, challenges to the long-prevailing
model of marriage could not be prevented" (pp. 194-95). During the
1940s the Supreme Court abandoned its hostility to migratory divorce,
and the American Bar Association recommended moving to a no-fault
principle in divorce (pp. 195-96). In the decade that followed, the
American Law Institute proposed a Model Penal Code that eliminated
all criminal sanctions for consensual sexual conduct.23
By the 1960s, the Supreme Court articulated a new vision of mar
riage. "Where mid-nineteenth-century judges and other public
spokesmen had hardly been able to speak of marriage without men
tioning Christian morality, mid-twentieth-century discourse saw the
hallmarks of the institution in liberty and privacy, consent and free
dom" (p. 197). Cott describes the tremendous importance of the

21. Pp. 164-67. Cott notes, however, that various aspects of coverture were unevenly
discarded. Pp. 160-63, 168-70.
22. P. 158. On the Civil War pension system, see pp. 103-04; on the Freedmen's Bureau,
see pp. 84-95; on the New Deal legislation, see pp. 172-79.
23. Pp. 196-97. Cott notes, however, that the Model Penal Code preserved the marital
rape exemption, pp. 196-97, and that it was not until the 1980s that this aspect of coverture
was gradually abandoned. Pp. 211-12.
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Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut,24 Loving v. Virginia,25
and Eisenstadt v. Baird,26 but she concludes that these decisions "were
just keeping pace with the upheavals in society," and that larger social
and legal changes were about "to uncouple morality from marriage"
(p. 199).
The last chapter of Public Vows catalogues the sweeping changes
in norms of marital and sexual behavior that occurred between 1965
and the closing years of the twentieth century. In the United States
and many other countries the demographic trends were dramatic:
"rates of formal marriages and of births tumbled; divorces and propor
tions of births outside formal wedlock both shot up" (p. 202). Large
majorities of women, including married women with young children,
entered the labor force. Just as divorce and nonmarital childbearing
became normalized, open cohabitation, same-sex relationships, and
sex before and outside of marriage were increasingly unremarkable.
Cott observes that courts and legislatures involved themselves in the
economic aspects of family relationships - enforcing prenuptial or
cohabitation agreements, dividing marital property at the time of di
vorce, ordering parents to pay child support - and largely abandoned
the project of enforcing standards of marital behavior and assessing
blame for marital breakdown (pp. 208-10).
Cott's analysis emphasizes the discontinuity between contempo
rary marriage and family practices and the model that once dominated
political and social life. She depicts the change in the relationship be
tween marriage and the state as fundamental and draws an analogy to
the abandonment of state-supported religion:
This alteration in the relation between marriage and the state might
be called "disestablishment," if the term can be borrowed from the his
tory of religion .... Disestablishment did not mean that piety or religious
institutions disappeared. On the contrary, the consequence more often
was that religious sects proliferated, while no single model was, any
longer, supported by the state. (p.212)

Based on this analogy, Cott suggests that "one could argue that the
particular model of marriage which was for so long the officially sup
ported one has been disestablished,'' and further that "with the weight
of the one supported faith lifted, plural acceptable sexual behaviors
and marriage types have bloomed" (p. 212). Cott rejects the disestab
lishment thesis, however, based upon the conservative "family values"
backlash that has developed since the mid-1970s. She identifies a re
surgence of the old "established" marriage model in two bills passed
by Congress in 1996 - the Defense of Marriage Act and the Personal
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act - and con
cludes: "If disestablishment of formal and legal Christian-model mo
nogamy were real, public authorities would grant the same imprimatur
to every kind of couple's marriage. This has not happened" (p. 215).
Ultimately, Cott understands both of these bills, along with the
"myriad marital obligations and benefits in the federal legal appara
tus," as illustrations of "the national government's continuing invest
ment in traditional marriage" (p. 223). She concludes by meditating on
the "resiliency of belief in legal marriage" and the "preeminent stature
of marriage in public opinion" despite the "sweeping reformulations"
of the last quarter century (pp. 224-27).
Cott explains Americans' continuing faith in marriage not with
reference to traditional values, but based upon "the relief it seems to
offer from the ineffable coercions and insistent publicity of the post
modern world" (p. 225). She states that marriage "recently and para
doxically signifies freedom in a chosen space," and it "harmonizes the
seeming opposites of choice and dependability" (p. 226). Marriage is
both public and private, "allying privacy with personal liberty and put
ting public authority behind that alliance" (p. 226). With this descrip
tion of marriage and its contemporary significance, Cott embraces a
perspective that sounds very much like Justice Douglas's opinion in
Griswold.

II.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND FAMILY LIFE

Nancy Cott has provided an enormous service to legal scholars by
marshalling the historical evidence that marriage as a social norm and
a legal category has been actively constructed and enforced over more
than two centuries through the combined agency of local communities
and state and national governments. She identifies the tension be
tween the ideology that conceived of marriage as based on natural or
divine law and the historical practice in which legislators have repeat
edly asserted the power to shape and change it.27 Whatever its private
meanings and importance, her book teaches us that marriage in the
United States, today and through history, has been politically defined.
It is also clear from Cott's scholarship that the public structuring of
marriage during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries served im
portant government purposes. Her epic touches on every aspect of
American history, and she identifies over and over again the instru
mental use of marriage to further other political ends.28 Often, those

27. See, e.g.,

pp. 46-47, 53, 56, 219.

28. As Cott notes in her Introduction, this instrumental use of marriage is not uniquely
American:
Typically, founders of new political societies in the Western tradition have inaugurated their
regimes with marriage regulations, to foster households conducive to their aims and to sym-
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other purposes have had to do with fundamental questions of mem
bership and belonging in American society.
In light of the history she presents, Cott's conclusion that the na
tional government maintains an interest in "traditional" marriage de
serves further exploration. What is that interest? Why, when the poli
tics and the conventional morality of the nineteenth century have been
almost entirely discarded, are its marital and sexual norms still power
ful enough to exclude a large group of Americans from full member
ship in the civil polity? The observation that marriage is a valuable
source of private and public meaning does not explain why law and
policy continue to privilege particular forms of marriage.
A.

The Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage

Following the pervasive disestablishment of marriage that Cott de
scribes, the only aspects of the traditional legal and moral norms that
are still widely enforced are restrictions on homosexual sex and the
corresponding prohibition of same-sex marriage.29 In the Supreme
Court, the privacy revolution that began with Griswold came abruptly
to an end with the 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.30 A few years
later, when courts in Hawaii and Alaska raised the possibility of legal
recognition for same-sex marriage, Congress joined the legislatures in
thirty-five states in enacting legislation designed to prevent the recog
nition of same-sex marriages.31 As Cott writes, "Where public authori
ties a century earlier had been primed to defend Christian-model mo
nogamy from free love, interracial coupling, polygamy, self-divorce,
and commercial sex, now the Congress found heterosexuality the cru
cial boundary to maintain" (p. 220).
Cott points out the similarity between the rhetoric about marriage
used by sponsors of the "Defense of Marriage Act" and the prevailing
marital rhetoric in the nineteenth century.32 "In the 1996 debate as in
the past, observance of Christian-model monogamy was made to stand
bolize a new era - whether in colonial Virginia, revolutionary France, the breakaway re
public of Texas, or the unprecedented Bolshevik system in the Soviet Union.
P. 6.
29. Cott notes: "The morality that the Jaw has dropped or soft-pedaled with respect to
consensual heterosexual acts still Jives in the law's prosecution of homosexual behavior."
P. 215.
30. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For other illustrations of the more conservative family politics
of the Court in the mid-1980s, see, for example, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989); and Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
31. See pp. 216-18. This wave of legislative action is reminiscent of the Comstock Act,
which was passed by Congress in 1873 and followed by parallel legislation in about half of
the states. See pp. 124-26.
32. Pp. 219-21. For example, Cott quotes Jesse Helms's speech declaring that "the moral
and spiritual survival of this Nation" was at stake. P. 221.
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for customary boundaries in society, morality and civilization; the na
tion's public backing of conventional marriage became a synecdoche
for everything valued in the American way of life."33
Beyond rhetoric, the controversy suggests other parallels to the
family politics of the nineteenth century. Cott reminds us of the long
standing debate over antimiscegenation laws and the prominent place
of marriage among the civil rights extended to former slaves after the
Civil War. She writes:
Lesbians and gay men seek legal marriage for some of the same rea
sons ex-slaves did so after the Civil War, to show that they have access to
basic civil rights. The exclusion of same-sex partners from free choice in
marriage stigmatizes their relationship, and reinforces a caste supremacy
of heterosexuality over homosexuality just as laws banning marriages
across the color line exhibited and reinforced white supremacy.Tailoring
their legal arguments to current constitutional doctrine, same-sex couples
have underlined the association of marriage with consent and with pri
vacy rights. (p. 216)

This analogy between antimiscegenation laws and laws barring
same-sex marriage was explicitly embraced by the Hawaii Supreme
Court in its pathbreaking 1993 decision recognizing the potential right
to same-sex marriage.34 The importance of marriage rights to full
membership in the political community is a more subtle point, which
finds contemporary support in the Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 de
cision in Baker v. State.35 Both the Hawaii and Vermont courts concep
tualized the same-sex marriage question as a matter of civil rights,
noting the wide range of statutory rights and obligations that flow
from marriage under state law, rather than as a question of sexual mo
rality.36
Striking parallels also exist between the campaign against same-sex
marriage and the longstanding battle against divorce and polygamy.37
Both divorce and polygamy were perceived in the nineteenth century
as serious threats to the national moral character. Divorce laws varied
considerably among the states, which created tensions in a federal sys-

33. P. 219. As Cott notes, this issue served as a rallying point for New Right conservative
groups whose "partisans . . . openly voice the desire to reinstate a patriarchal model of mar
riage with the husband/father as the provider and the primary authority figure." P. 214.
34. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61-63 (Haw. 1993) (discussing parallel to Loving v.
Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967)).
35. Baker v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (addressing marriage rights as
one of the "common benefits" of state citizens).
36. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 883-84 (listing benefits and protections of marriage under
state law); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 58-59 (same). See generally Ann Laquer Estin, When Baehr
Meets Romer: Family Law Issues After Amendment 2, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 349, 370-71
(1997).
37. See generally David L. Chambers,
L. REV. 53 (1997).
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tern (pp. 49-52, 110-11). Opponents of divorce preached from a na
tional pulpit (pp. 105-07), but their efforts to establish uniform na
tional restrictions on divorce did not succeed. The national conversa
tion about divorce continued, and states continued to display
considerable diversity in their divorce policies until the no-fault di
vorce revolution a century later.
State laws regulating the family rights and obligations of same-sex
couples are similarly divergent. In the present era, however, federal
ism concerns are more readily swept aside. National politics are di
rected toward preventing the possibility that states can effectively
broaden their definition of marriage, or toward limiting the wider con
sequences if one state or group of states move in that direction.38
By contrast, the practice of polygamy during the nineteenth cen
tury seems to have been limited to the Utah Territory, and to have
had few defenders in other parts of the nation. Laws for the territory
were written by Congress, and Utah did not achieve statehood until
after the Mormon church renounced polygamy in 1890 (p. 120). Since
that time, there has been very little public concern with polygamy, and
no movement toward changing this aspect of marriage law.39
The contemporary debate, like its precursors in the nineteenth
century, is a definitional one, about fundamental questions of mem
bership and belonging. Mormon polygamists were an easily identifi
able group, separated from the mainstream by their unique religion
and geography as well as their marital practices. In a time when racial
difference and the progress of civilization loomed large in American
consciousness, Mormon cultural variance was particularly threatening
(pp. 114-18). Mormons were politically organized and actively resisted
national authority, raising another alarm for a nation still recovering
from the Civil War.40 In contrast to polygamists, individuals who pur
sued divorces could not be so easily isolated and stigmatized, and
38. In addition to DOMA, there are recent proposals to amend the U.S. Constitution to
prohibit same-sex marriage. See Jonathan Rauch, Leave Gay Marriage to the States, WALL
ST. J., July 27, 2001, at A87 (discussing proposed "Federal Marriage Amendment"). Cott
notes that a constitutional amendment prohibiting polygamy was debated in Congress dur
ing the 1885-86 year. P. 119
39. Cott points out that the practice has been revived among fundamentalist Mormons
in Utah and Arizona. P. 213. With regard to public opinion, Cott notes the 1946 decision in
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). The majority opinion by Justice Douglas
quoted from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), and held that Mormon polygamy
was an immoral practice within the definition of the Mann Act. Cleveland, 98 U.S. at 18. This
time, however, there was a dissenting opinion in which Justice Frank Murphy argued that
polygamy was "a form of marriage built upon a set of social and moral principles" which
could not be equated with debauchery or prostitution. Id. at 24-29; see also p. 194.
40. Cott writes that "[s)evere antipolygamist pronouncements of the 1880s commonly
likened the Mormons' political threat to the peril posed by the Confederacy, and even sug
gested that another civil war might be necessary." P. 118. On the Mormon political threat,
see Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay's Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy,
1854-1887, 13 YALE. J.L. & FEMINISM 29 (2001).
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states with more liberal divorce laws remained solidly within the un
ion. For all the anxiety about divorce, membership in the larger politi
cal community was never at risk.
Although state-sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals is
somewhat comparable to racial discrimination before the Civil Rights
Act, significant differences remain. Because sexual orientation is more
readily concealed than race, gays and lesbians more often choose - or
feel compelled - to pass or to cover.41 Sexual orientations are widely
distributed across geographic regions and across social class, political,
racial, ethnic, religious, and family groups. These factors will make it
much more difficult over the long range to sustain the kinds of legal
rules that exclude gays and lesbians from full membership in the civil
polity.42
Considering these parallels, Cott may be too quick to discard her
thesis about the disestablishment of marriage. While she notes cor
rectly that large majorities in Congress supported the Defense of Mar
riage Act, (p. 220), it is not clear how many of the Senators and Rep
resentatives who voted for the Act shared the ideological stance of its
sponsors.43 By the time of the 2000 presidential election, prominent
politicians noted their opposition to marriage rights for gay and les
bian couples, but they argued in favor of extending many of the rights
incident to marriage to these couples through devices such as domestic
partnerships.44 In the last decade, Hawaii, California, and Vermont
have made available comprehensive statewide domestic partnership
registration. In Vermont, the 2000 civil union law established a close
equivalent to marriage for same sex partners.45 Even within the
41.
(2002).

See generally

Kenji Yoshino,

Covering,

111

YALE

L.J. 769, 875-78, 889, 925-27

42. This also suggests that change in attitudes will be a gradual process. See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil
Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 881 (2001) ("The genius of Vermont's equality practice is that
the state insisted that traditional family values give way to the recognition of lesbian and gay
rights, but lesbian and gay family values give way to accommodation of traditionalist anxie
ties for the time being.").
43. Some of those who voted for the act indicated substantial ambivalence about the
bill. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Panel Passes Bill to Let States Refuse to Recognize Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1996, at A15 (quoting comments of Rep. Sonny Bono, R-Cal.); John E.
Yang, House Votes to Curb Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, July 13, 1996, at Al (quoting
comment of Rep. Peter Deutsh, D-Fla.); .
44. See, e.g., Jim Fitzgerald, Hillary Voices Opposition to Gay Marriage - First Lady
Says She Supports Full Benefits for Same-Sex Couples but not Matrimony, NEWARK STAR
LEDGER, Jan. 11, 2000 available at 2000 WL 4250754; Bob Hohler & Susan Milligan, Mild
Tone Marks Gore-Bradley Exchange, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2000, at A23 (reporting that
both Al Gore and Bill Bradley support domestic partnership but not same sex marriage); see
also Estin, supra note 36, at 363 n.76 (citing comments by Ann Landers, William Safire, and
Roy Romer made in 1996.)
45. Codified in part at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 and tit. 18 §§ 5160-5169
(2000). Other countries including Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, the Netherlands,
France, Germany, and Finland have extended benefits to registered same-sex domestic part-
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Supreme Court, the authority of Bowers v. Hardwick has been un
dermined by the more recent ruling in Romer v. Evans.46 These
changes have entailed controversy, but polling data suggests that at
least half of Americans support extension of health insurance, Social
Security benefits, and inheritance rights to same-sex partners, and that
about a third support same sex marriage.47
Over time, if public opinion continues to shift, same-sex marriage
will no longer be so unthinkable. Cott's book shows us that interracial
marriage was actively disputed before the Civil War and for more than
a century afterward (pp. 40-45, 98-103, 163-64, 184-85, 198), and the
liberalization of divorce laws was a process that returned to state leg
islatures regularly for at least 150 years (pp. 47-52, 106-11, 195-96, 20507). By comparison, the debate over same-sex marriage has pro
gressed remarkably quickly.48
Ironically, as Cott underlines, the campaign by gays and lesbians
for access to marriage rights has bolstered the status of marriage by
enhancing our understanding of its public and private benefits both for
a couple and for the larger society (p. 225). What is most striking
about the Vermont compromise, however, is the decoupling of "rights
and benefits" and the institution of marriage. The greater obstacle for
advocates of same-sex marriage rights may not be the New Right, but
the nagging discomfort that many in the political center or left still feel
with the prospect of broadening the definition of marriage to include
gays and lesbians.49

ners. The Netherlands also permits same-sex couples to marry. See Keith B. Richburg, Dutch
Sept. 13, 2000, at A28.

Legalize Same-Sex Marriages, WASH. POST,

46. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying equal protection principles to invalidate an amend
ment to the Colorado constitution that prevented enforcement of laws or ordinances pro
hibiting discrimination against gays, lesbians, or bisexuals). See generally Estin, supra note
36, at 365-70. Although Bowers has not been overruled, the Georgia statute it considered
was found to be an unconstitutional infringement of the right to privacy under the state con
stitution in Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
47. See Will Lester, U.S. Mixed on Same-Sex Marriage, DENVER POST, June 1, 2000, at
A06 (reporting that 51 percent of respondents opposed same-sex marriage while 34 percent
approved). When constitutional amendments to bar same-sex marriage went to the voters in
Hawaii and Alaska in 1998, more than two-thirds of the voters in each state supported the
ban. See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 874.
48. See also Yoshino, supra note 41, at 783-84 (noting argument that movement for gay
rights has moved further and faster than any previous movement).
49. See David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage": The First Amendment and Mar
riage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 956 (2001) (suggesting that the
prospect of change to a more inclusive institution of marriage "threatens or unsettles the
identities of marriage conventionalists who currently benefit personally from marriage's
symbolism"); see also David L. Chambers, The Baker Case, Civil Unions, and the Recogni
tion of Our Common Humanity: An Introduction and a Speculation, 25 VT. L. REV. 5, 12
(2000). Of course, there are also different views within the lesbian and gay community as to
the desirability and importance of full marriage rights.
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Marriage and the Shape of Welfare Reform

Cott argues that marriage in the twentieth century has been de
fined primarily in economic terms, and the national government has
repeatedly reinforced traditional marriage patterns by using them in
structuring public programs (pp. 174-79, 190-94). In this context, it is
not surprising to encounter marriage norms embedded in the welfare
reform legislation enacted by Congress in 1996. Cott notes the recitals
at the beginning of the bill, which declare marriage to be "the founda
tion of a successful society," and "an essential institution of a success
ful society which promotes the interests of children" (pp. 221-22).
These recitals reflected the belief by many of the act's proponents that
public assistance programs undermine both marriage and parental re
sponsibility. 50
The concern for family life that animates the welfare reform law is
notably different from the concern that structures other benefit pro
grams targeted at non-poor families. In earlier chapters of her book,
Cott describes the distinction made under the 1935 Social Security Act
between the more generous social insurance benefits targeted at full
time (white, male, able-bodied) workers and the more stringent public
assistance programs available for families without male breadwin
ners. 51 Benefit levels were higher for married men, and while policy
makers understood that they were overtaxing single men and all
women contributors, they saw this inequity "as a useful incentive to
men to marry and have families, and to women to be stay-at-home
wives and mothers" (p. 177). Cott notes the interaction of the federal
program with state family support laws: "The Social Security program
rewarded men for taking on family responsibilities, while state-level
apparatus policed them if they faltered in delivering support" (p. 176).
The politics of the welfare reform bill reflect an ideal of family fi
nancial independence that flies in the face of the American experi
ence.52 Cott points out that the rhetoric suggested that "the marriage
50. Cott writes
Proponents assumed rather than probed what were the reasons behind the correlation be
tween marriage and economic stability.They did not give equal attention to highly relevant
and complex issues of sex segregation and racial stratification in the labor market; they did
not question how far the rise of illegitimacy and female-headed households, and the decline
in marriage, were larger phenomena not caused by welfare.
P. 222.
51 . Pp. 1 74-78. Cott notes that while there was no explicit reference to gender or race in
the law, the act excluded coverage of "part-time, seasonal, agricultural, domestic, philan
thropic, and government employees (including teachers), and the self-employed. These were
exactly the areas where women wage-earners, and African-American and Latino men as
well, were concentrated." P. 175.
52. See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN
FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 68-92 (1 992) (arguing that "depending on support
beyond the family has been the rule rather than the exception in American history").
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ceremony itself magically solved the problem of poverty" (p. 222).
There are echoes in the legislation of the approach taken by the
Freedmen's Bureau, "linking legal marriage to the requisite ethic of
hard work and reinforcing normatively the husband's and father's re
sponsibility to support his dependents" (pp. 222-23). In the late twen
tieth century, paid work became "a requirement and an emblem of full
citizenship for both women and men" (p. 223). Women and men who
are not self-sufficient, or not able to support their children, are seen as
less than full members of the polity, and therefore are denied some of
the rights that go along with citizenship.53
This is also a problem of membership and belonging. The most im
portant right denied to poor families is precisely the one that now de
fines family life. Cott writes, "The national value placed on marital
and familial privacy did not extend to families in need of help. Welfare
mothers and fathers could not enjoy 'a private realm of family life
where the state cannot enter' " (p. 223). Rather than supporting pri
vacy and autonomy, federal welfare laws have "brought public over
sight into the lives of the poor" (p. 223). Because poor families are
subject to public oversight, they are subject to public condemnation oh
moral grounds for behaviors, such as nonmarital cohabitation and
childbearing, that no longer provoke sanction or comment among the
rest of the population.
Seen in the larger historical perspective, these politics seem un
likely to change. Intrusive and punitive regulation of poor families has
a very long history.54 Current policy continues to move in this direc
tion, with new initiatives to promote marriage among the poor at the
center of early debate over reauthorization of the 1996 law.55 Nothing
in the history Cott recounts suggests much willingness to guarantee all
families a measure of economic security, or to understand poor fami
lies as equally deserving of privacy and autonomy in the family choices
they make.
These politics are both the same as and entirely different from
those surrounding same-sex marriage. As Cott suggests, both pieces of
legislation reflect a resurgence of traditional values in national legisla
tion. In both, the coercive power of government is evident. But we
might also note a contradiction: while the national government ex
horts one group of citizens to embrace traditional marriage, it simulta53. Public condemnation of "deadbeat dads" and increasingly harsh methods of child
support enforcement, including suspension of passports, as well as occupational, recrea
tional, and driving licenses, is one illustration of this trend.
54. Cott notes the racial and gender politics at work here. P. 221.
55.

See, e.g., Amy Goldstein, Looking Beyond Jobs in Welfare Reform; Conservatives
Advise States to Promote Marriage, Abstinence, Stronger Families, WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2001, at A21; Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush Urges Work and Marriage Programs in
Welfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18; Robin Toner, Welfare Chief is Hoping to
Promote Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at Al.
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neously forecloses the opportunity to another group. Marriage is both
pushed and pulled, urged and denied, extended and withheld.
III.

CONCLUSION

With Public Vows, Nancy Cott demonstrates that the national po
litical stage has been a central location for normative pronouncements
about marriage and family life throughout American history. Marriage
has been the language used to define and debate fundamental ques
tions of citizenship and belonging in the larger national community.
As the national character has changed and evolved, so have the par
ticulars of what marriage means.
As a result of the sweeping disestablishment of marriage during
the middle years of the twentieth century, Americans now understand
choices about family life as more private, and individuals are accorded
correspondingly greater freedom in making these choices. At the same
time, marriage norms are still central to the government's provision
for families, organizing large numbers of rights and obligations at both
the state and federal level. Marriage norms are still interjected into
political discourse to define some families as deviant and to mark off
some individuals as less worthy of full membership.
Like a coin or a sword, the public structure of marriage has two
sides. One, more benevolent, lends symbolic and material support to
private family commitments. The other, more coercive, marshals the
state's authority to control and regulate the most personal aspects of
our lives. For the political majority, however, this coercive face is
rarely felt or identified. As Cott writes, "the more that marriage is fig
ured as a free and individual choice - as it is today in the United
States - the less the majority can see the compulsion to be involved at
all" (p. 8). With Public Vows, Cott shows us what lies behind and un
derneath our "common sense" about marriage, challenges us to recon
sider the things we take for granted about families, and reminds us
that for some Americans, there is another side to the story.

